SQE1 · Subject page 4 · 7 min read

SQE1 FLK1 subject notes: negligence (duty, breach, causation, remoteness), pure economic loss and psychiatric harm, employers' liability, defences, vicarious liability, occupiers' liability, product liability, nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, and remedies.

What this subject covers

The SRA specification covers negligence (duty and standard of care, breach, causation, remoteness, remedies for personal injury and death, pure economic loss, psychiatric harm and employers' primary liability); the defences of consent, contributory negligence, illegality and necessity; vicarious liability; occupiers' liability to visitors and non-visitors; product liability in negligence and under the Consumer Protection Act 1987; and public and private nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, with their remedies and defences.

Key principles

Duty of care

• Where an established category applies (road users, doctor and patient, employer and employee, manufacturer and consumer), it is followed (Donoghue v Stevenson; Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire). In novel cases the court develops the law incrementally by analogy, asking whether harm was foreseeable, whether there was proximity, and whether a duty would be fair, just and reasonable (Caparo Industries v Dickman).
• There is generally no liability for pure omissions or for harm caused by third parties, unless the defendant created the danger or assumed responsibility.

Breach

• The standard is objective: the reasonable person in the defendant's position. Learners are judged as competent drivers (Nettleship v Weston); children by the standard of a reasonable child of the same age (Mullin v Richards).
• Professionals are not negligent if they acted in accordance with a practice accepted by a responsible body of opinion (Bolam), provided that opinion withstands logical analysis (Bolitho). Advice on risks is judged differently: a doctor must take reasonable care to disclose material risks (Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board).
• Relevant factors include the likelihood and seriousness of harm, the cost of precautions, and the social value of the activity.

Causation and remoteness

• But for: the claimant must prove on the balance of probabilities that the harm would not have happened without the breach (Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington HMC). Loss of a chance is not recoverable in personal injury (Gregg v Scott).
• Multiple causes: a material contribution to an indivisible harm caused cumulatively is enough (Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw); the material increase in risk exception is confined to cases such as mesothelioma (Fairchild).
• Intervening acts: a free, deliberate act of a third party, or the claimant's own wholly unreasonable conduct (McKew v Holland), may break the chain.
• Remoteness: the kind of damage must be reasonably foreseeable (The Wagon Mound (No 1)), but not its precise manner (Hughes v Lord Advocate) or extent (eggshell skull: Smith v Leech Brain).

Pure economic loss and negligent misstatement

• Pure economic loss from a negligent act is generally irrecoverable, although loss consequential on physical damage is recoverable (Spartan Steel v Martin).
• For negligent statements, a duty arises where the defendant assumed responsibility and the claimant reasonably relied (Hedley Byrne v Heller), and the defendant knew the statement would be relied on for a particular purpose (Caparo: no duty from auditors to investors buying shares).

Psychiatric harm

• Primary victims are within the range of foreseeable physical injury; a recognised psychiatric illness is recoverable even if no physical injury occurs (Page v Smith).
• Secondary victims must show a close tie of love and affection with the person endangered, presence at the accident or its immediate aftermath, and perception with their own unaided senses (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire; Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust).

Employers' primary liability

Employers owe a personal, non-delegable duty to provide competent staff, adequate plant and equipment, a safe place of work and a safe system of work (Wilsons and Clyde Coal v English). Under the Employers' Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 an employer is deemed negligent where equipment it provided is defective through a third party's fault.

Defences

• Consent (volenti): full knowledge and voluntary acceptance of the risk; not available against a passenger where motor insurance is compulsory (Road Traffic Act 1988, s 149).
• Contributory negligence (Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945): damages reduced as is just and equitable; seatbelt guidelines of 25% or 15% (Froom v Butcher).
• Illegality: no recovery for loss flowing from the claimant's own crime and its punishment (Gray v Thames Trains; Henderson v Dorset Healthcare).
• Necessity: acting to prevent a greater harm.

Vicarious liability

Two stages: a relationship of employment or one akin to employment, and a close connection between that relationship and the tort (Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society; Mohamud v Morrison Supermarkets; WM Morrison Supermarkets v Various Claimants). There is no vicarious liability for genuinely independent contractors (Various Claimants v Barclays Bank).

Occupiers' liability

• Visitors (Occupiers' Liability Act 1957): the common duty of care to take reasonable care that the visitor is reasonably safe (s 2(2)). Occupiers must expect children to be less careful (s 2(3)(a)), but may expect parents to supervise very young children (Phipps v Rochester Corp); specialists may be expected to guard against risks of their trade (s 2(3)(b)). A warning discharges the duty only if enough to make the visitor reasonably safe (s 2(4)(a)). An occupier who chose a competent independent contractor and checked the work where reasonable is not liable for the contractor's faulty work (s 2(4)(b)). Exclusion is limited by UCTA and, for consumers, the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
• Non-visitors (Occupiers' Liability Act 1984): a duty arises where the occupier knows of the danger, knows or has reasonable grounds to believe the non-visitor may be near it, and the risk is one it can reasonably be expected to protect against (s 1(3)). Only personal injury is covered (s 1(8)). There is no duty to protect against obvious risks people choose to run (Tomlinson v Congleton BC).

Product liability

• In negligence, a manufacturer owes a duty to the ultimate consumer (Donoghue v Stevenson).
• Under Part 1 Consumer Protection Act 1987 liability is strict. Defendants: the producer, an own-brander, and the importer; a supplier who fails to identify the producer on request (s 2). A product is defective if its safety is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect (s 3). Defences include the development risks defence (s 4(1)(e)). Damage covers death, personal injury and private property worth over 275 pounds, but not the product itself (s 5). Claims must be brought within three years, subject to a ten-year longstop from when the product was put into circulation.

Nuisance and Rylands v Fletcher

• Private nuisance: an unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land, judged by locality, duration, sensitivity and malice (Christie v Davey; Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett). Only a person with an interest in the land may sue (Hunter v Canary Wharf). Coming to the nuisance is no defence; 20 years' prescription is (Sturges v Bridgman; Coventry v Lawrence). The usual remedy is an injunction, but damages in lieu are at the court's discretion (Coventry v Lawrence).
• Public nuisance: affecting a class of the public; an individual needs special damage to sue.
• Rylands v Fletcher: strict liability for the escape of something likely to do mischief, brought onto land in the course of an extraordinary use, where damage of that type was foreseeable (Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather; Transco v Stockport MBC). It protects land; personal injury is not recoverable under it.

Remedies for personal injury and death

• Special damages: calculable past losses to trial. General damages: pain, suffering and loss of amenity, and future losses such as earnings and care.
• On death, the deceased's own claim survives for the estate (Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934); dependants claim loss of dependency, and certain relatives a bereavement award (Fatal Accidents Act 1976).

Worked example

A delivery driver employed by Nore Ltd reverses negligently on a customer's driveway, injuring Pat, a visitor, and damaging her car. Pat was looking at her phone and had walked behind the van.

1. Duty and breach: a driver owes road users and pedestrians a duty; reversing without looking falls below the standard of a reasonable driver.
2. Causation and remoteness: but for the reversing, Pat would not have been hurt; personal injury and damage to her car are foreseeable kinds of harm.
3. Defences: Pat's inattention may reduce her damages for contributory negligence; consent is not available.
4. Vicarious liability: the driver is Nore Ltd's employee, and driving on a delivery is closely connected with the job, so Nore Ltd is vicariously liable.
5. Remedies: special damages for her past losses and car repairs, general damages for her pain, suffering and loss of amenity and any future losses.

Scope follows the SRA's SQE1 Functioning Legal Knowledge Assessment Specification (FLK1, Tort). The notes are our own summary, not SRA material. Law of England and Wales as at 1 September 2026 (the SRA assesses the law as it stands four calendar months before the first assessment in a window).